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Questioning Contingency in Social Life:  
Roles, Agreement and Agency  
 
By Stephen Kemp and John Holmwood 
 
Abstract: Structure/agency theories presuppose that there is a unity to 
structure that distinguishes it from the (potential) diversity of agents’ 
responses.  In doing so they formally divide the robust social processes 
shaping the social world (structure) from contingent agential variation 
(agency).  In this article we question this division by critically evaluating its 
application to the concept of role in critical realism and structural 
functionalism.  We argue that Archer, Elder-Vass and Parsons all mistakenly 
understand a role to have a singular structural definition which agents may 
then diverge from.  Drawing on the work of Gross, Mason and McEachern 
we argue instead that if agents diverge in their conceptions of what role 
incumbents should do, there is no single role definition, but rather a range of 
diverse role-expectations.  Acknowledging this can help us to understand 
variation in role behaviour, with different incumbents potentially being more 
exposed to some expectations than others.  We argue that considering roles 
in this way can extend the ability of social scientists to identify robust social 
processes shaping role behaviour and decrease the extent to which they need 
to call on contingent factors in such explanations.   
 
 
1.  Introduction 
One way in which theories in the social sciences can be divided is in their attitude to 
contingency.  At one extreme we have the view that social life is so contingent in 
character that there are no social influences or processes that span across locales – 
rather, each situation is fundamentally different from the next.  At the other extreme, 
we have the view that there is no contingency in social life, that all aspects of it are 
deeply shaped by social processes and influences that produce outcomes in the social 
world.  Over the last 30 or 40 years, there has been a drift in social science away from 
a belief in the existence of robust social processes and towards an emphasis on 
contingency.  This is apparent in a range of positions that otherwise have different 
commitments, including complexity and chaos theory, post-structuralism and 
ethnomethodology.  For example, complexity and chaos theorists argue that many, 
perhaps all, outcomes in the social world are the product of contingent causal 
interplays, and are so sensitive to subtle changes that social scientific accounts cannot 
plausibly move beyond particular, local accounts (cf Cilliers, 1998; Radford, 2008).   
 
One of the most common ways to challenge approaches based entirely on contingency 
is to accept that it has some part to play in the social world but attempt to formally 
delimit that role.  The key move here is the attempt to identify the scope and 
contribution of systematic features on the one hand, and contingent particularities on 
the other,  prior to inquiry.  This kind of move is present in structural-functionalism 
and, more, recently, in critical realism.  For exponents of structural functionalism, 
such as Parsons, there are system processes which shape what actors do in important 
ways; but these robust processes are not the only factors that produce social outcomes.  
Rather, contingencies such as deviant behaviour also play a role (Parsons, 1952).  For 
critical realists, there are structures which have an influence upon the social world and 
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shape the outcomes that can occur at any given time; but there is also agency, which 
is a key contributor to the contingency of occurrences in the social world (Bhaskar, 
1979; Archer, 1995).  In both approaches, robust social processes (system processes 
or structures) are conceptually separated from contingent features (deviance or 
agency) prior to inquiry. 
 
Although we are critical of a fully contingency-based picture of the social world (see 
Holmwood, 1996; Kemp, 2009), we want to argue that attempts to formally divide the 
systematic from the contingent are problematic as an alternative.  Specifically, by 
identifying certain features of the social world as contingent a priori this theoretical 
architecture encourages inquirers to give up too swiftly on the possibility of 
explaining diversity with reference to robust social influences.  Instead of starting 
from an assumption that certain aspects of the social world must be accounted for by 
reference to contingent factors, we want to encourage investigators to start by 
attempting a systematic explanation of the aspects of the social world that they are 
concerned with, although a satisfactory account may not always be produced.  
Positioning this argument, it might be said that we share with critical realists an 
interest in promoting empirical social scientific research into social processes, but are 
concerned to avoid theoretical divisions which inadvertently limit such inquiry.  For 
the purposes of this article a systematic social explanation is a theory which argues for 
the existence of robust social processes and/or influences that, when they operate, 
promote a certain (kind of) outcome, other things being equal.
1
  By contrast, a social 
scientific account based on ad hoc contingencies, argues that there are no robust 
social processes bringing about the outcome – rather it is the result of factors that are 
particular in character, and may not be attributable to the realm of ‘the social’ at all.2 
 
Clearly, there exists a huge range of areas in which questions of contingency and 
systematicity in social life can be analysed, and not all can be considered within one 
article.  In order to narrow the field to create a manageable discussion, we are going to 
focus particularly on these issues in relation to roles and role behaviour.  Of particular 
interest here is how to account for the apparent fact that actors who seem to be 
engaged in the same role – whether it be that of teacher, police officer or garbage 
collector – sometimes behave in diverse ways.  Is the explanation to do with 
contingent features such as deviance or agency, or might it reside in systematic 
features of roles themselves?  We have chosen to focus on the concept of roles for a 
number of reasons.  For one thing, it has historically been an important area in which 
the explanation of social actions has been analysed, with accounts trying to identify 
the character of role behaviour and the place of contingency in it.  For another thing, 
the concept of role has re-emerged in some contemporary social theories, particularly 
in the work of critical realist thinkers concerned with the structure and agency debate, 
such as Margaret Archer (1995, 2000b) and Dave Elder-Vass (2010).  Although it 
would be incorrect to say that the concept of role is central to critical realism, 
conceptualizations of roles have featured in debates between defenders of different 
theoretical positions as a basis on which their positions can be differentiated (King, 
2004; Archer, 2000a; Elder-Vass, REF, 2007a).  Furthermore, the way in which 
critical realists analyse roles is consistent with their more general approach to social 
explanation and contingency and is illuminating in that respect.  Third, looking at the 
concept of role allows us to connect contemporary debates with earlier theoretical 
discussions and recover insights that have been to some extent ignored.  Although 
Archer and Elder-Vass employ the concept of role, neither of them discusses critiques 
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of the concept of role in functionalism, previously the major sociological position 
concerned with roles.  Making this connection allows us to see both the continuities 
and discontinuities between past and present social theorizing, and also to revive an 
important line of argument from past debates.  In reconsidering and developing the 
ideas of Gross, Mason and McEachern, put forward in their Explorations in Role 
Analysis (1958), we believe that we can also contribute to contemporary research that 
employs the concept of role. 
 
To summarise the argument that follows, our specific engagement with role theories 
exemplifies our wider commitment to systematic explanation.  The specific argument 
is that prominent existing analyses of roles have a problematic theoretical structure.  
Both structural-functionalism and critical realism make a division between the social 
expectations surrounding a role, which they see as singular in character, and the 
performance of a role, which they see as potentially diverse in character.  We will 
argue that analysts see the systematic processes influencing role behaviour as oriented 
towards promoting behaviour in line with a singular set of expectations.  By doing so, 
these analysts lock themselves into accounting for role variation by reference to 
contingency.  Following Gross, Mason and McEachern (1958) we argue for the 
alternative view that role expectations should be seen as plural in character, reflecting 
the way in which a role may be defined differently by different groups of social 
actors.  We suggest that this alternative approach encourages systematic social 
explanation of variations in role behaviour rather than ruling it out.  Our argument 
about roles thus exemplifies our wider concern to both promote an orientation to 
systematic explanation and to question approaches that attempt to fix the scope of 
contingency in social life a priori. 
 
 
2.  Delimiting Social Explanation: Diverse Role Behaviour as Contingent 
In this section we will be suggesting that despite certain differences, there is an 
important degree of overlap between structural-functionalist and critical realist 
accounts of roles and role-behaviours.  Key representatives of both approaches argue 
that each role has a singular definition, and that processes of coordination and/or 
sanctioning shape actors’ behaviour towards this definition.  However proponents of 
both approaches also accept that the behaviour of actors within each role can be 
diverse.  Problematically, from our perspective, this variation of behaviours is not 
treated as potentially explicable by reference to robust social influences, but is 
typically accounted for by reference to contingent deviance or agency.  As such, 
structural-functionalists and critical realists make a conceptual division within their 
analyses that formally delimits the scope of systematic social analysis and identifies 
certain phenomena as intrinsically contingent in character.   
 
Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying what we mean when we say that theorists see 
role definitions as singular.  This is not to say that such theorists see all agents as 
content with existing role definitions.  Rather it is that they understand a role to be 
defined by a single set of expectations which all participants take to define the role at 
the present time.  We will refer to this assumption as the idea that roles are 
characterised by ‘definitional agreement’ or by a ‘singular’ set of expectations.3   
 
Structural-Functionalism 
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We will begin by considering structural-functionalism and then move on to critical 
realism.  The classic structural-functionalist work dealing with roles is Talcott 
Parsons’ The Social System (1952).  Simplifying Parsons’ analysis somewhat for the 
sake of the reader, we can say that he sees a role as part of a system of social 
relationships, in which a role defines what an actor ‘does in his relations with others 
seen in the context of its functional significance for the social system’ (Parsons, 1952: 
25).  In a functional system, a role will be based on an institutionalized common 
standard, in other words, it will have a single shared definition given from the point of 
view of the system (Parsons, 1952: 249).  Because roles involve relations with others, 
the issue for Parsons is how interactions can be well-coordinated (orderly), and he 
contends that this can only be achieved by actors interacting with one another in a 
way which is constrained towards a common standard (Parsons, 1952: 37; 249).  On 
the side of the role incumbent, s/he needs to grasp role expectations which set the 
standard for his/her behaviour.  But the other who is related to must also have these 
expectations, and also has the ability to sanction through positive or negative response 
depending on whether the expectations are upheld (Parsons, 1952: 38).  It is correct to 
say that for Parsons, concrete (actual) action systems may not be fully integrated, that 
is fully coordinated (a point not often grasped by critics, as Holmwood [1996] points 
out).  Nevertheless, the robust social processes that Parsons identifies are ones which 
push towards coordination – towards orderly behaviour, and thus towards a singular 
definition for each role.  Common role standards are promoted by the need for the 
actions of individuals to be coordinated with one another, and behaviour consistent 
with these is reinforced by sanctioning. 
 
Although he focuses on social processes which shape behaviour towards consistency 
with role definitions, Parsons does allow that there may be some diversity of 
behaviour by those who are incumbents in roles, but that this diversity is attributed to 
contingency rather than to systematic social processes (for discussion see Holmwood, 
1996).  Parsons’ most analytically developed account of diverse behaviour in roles 
focuses on the way in which role incumbents with deviant motivations may not 
conform to role expectations (Parsons, 1952: 249-280).
4
  Indeed, the need for negative 
sanctions alongside positive ones is, for Parsons, a recognition of motivations towards 
deviance.  Deviant actors may display an indifference to expectations or an 
‘incorrigible’ inclination to go against these expectations (Parsons, 1952: 260).  
However, Parsons offers little by way of a systematic social explanation of 
diverse/deviant behaviour.  In The Social System, Parsons treats deviant motivations 
as resulting from certain kinds of strains that may be developed or accentuated in 
interaction, but his discussion of the ‘genesis’ of these motivations does not account 
for the initial basis of those strains (Parsons, 1952: 251-6).  Given that the main social 
processes that Parsons identifies are those oriented to coordination, this is hardly 
surprising, as with such commitments it becomes very difficult to explain 
diverse/deviant behaviour socially.  Rather, Parsons accounts for deviance/diversity 
by attributing it to the contingent failure of processes that should tend towards 
integration.  The on-going task of making socialization effective implies the 
possibility of contingent failure (Parsons, 1952: 201-7).  But this general possibility 
does not allow us to socially explain any particular instance of deviance/diversity, but 
merely presents it as a contingent failure that might have developed at any point. 
 
Parsons’ account is problematic because it rules out the possibility of giving a 
systematic social account of diverse role behaviour – socially intelligible processes 
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are understood to promote singularity rather than diversity.  Indeed, even when 
speaking most directly about deviance, Parsons still sees the deviant actor as relating 
to common expectations: 
 
‘A tendency to deviance in this sense is a process of motivated action, on the 
part of an actor who has unquestionably had a full opportunity to learn the 
requisite orientations, tending to deviate from the complementary expectations 
of conformity with common standards so far as these are relevant to the 
definitions of his [sic] role.’ (Parsons, 1952: 206) 
 
A further problem is that, for Parsons, socially meaningful action is based on the 
sharing of values and expectations with others, with the result that deviant actions 
must always tend towards social meaninglessness in his analysis.  Might it not be 
better to argue that there may be multiple socially intelligible standards of meaning 
and expectation, and account for diverse actions by reference to these diverse 
standards (including emergent new standards)?  We will return to this point later.  
 
Critical Realism 
What we want to suggest now is that critical realist treatments of diversity of role 
behaviour share certain important features with functionalist approaches.  This is, of 
course, not to suggest that critical realism, as a theoretical approach, is identical to 
structural-functionalism.  But it is to suggest that two somewhat different critical 
realist approaches, those of Archer and Elder-Vass, analyse diversity in a similar 
manner to functionalism.  That is to say, they identify a robust social process which is 
understood to influence the behaviour of role incumbents towards consistency with a 
single set of role definitions; they then acknowledge diversity within role enactment 
but attribute this to contingency rather than to systematic social processes.  The 
difference with functionalism is not in the form of the analysis, but that 
the contingent element is assigned a positive normative value, and is described as 
‘agency’. 
 
It is important to be clear that when we characterize an approach as arguing that roles 
have a single set of definitions we are not saying that it will exclude ‘structural’ 
differentiation within any role.  Our argument is that what such an approach excludes 
is the possibility that there will be no single set of expectations for a role, however 
differentiated it is.  So, for example, theoretical frameworks like critical realism and 
functionalism can accept that within the role of ‘parent’ there are further 
differentiations into ‘father’ and ‘mother’, seeing each of these as having different 
expectations.  What they do not accept is that for a role like ‘father’ there may be no 
single set of expectations because different actors/groups within society have 
different, although potentially partially overlapping, conceptions of what being a 
‘father’ involves.  We see this as not merely a chance absence but as built into the 
structure of the meta-theory.  In the case of critical realism, it derives, as we shall see, 
from the separation of structure and agency.  In relation to roles this separation is 
based on an implicit assumption that there is something shared by all (roles/norms 
with a singular definition) which agents may then diverge from.  The difficulty, we 
will suggest, is in retaining the notion of a ‘structural’ shared definition of role 
expectations in cases where agents do diverge in their role expectations.  
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To understand Archer’s analysis of roles, we need to consider her commitment to 
‘analytical dualism’.  This is the idea that social scientists should separate out the 
‘parts’ of society – structures –  from the ‘people’ – agents –  and analyse the 
interplay of these elements (Archer, 1995).  According to Archer this is necessary 
because although structure and agency do interact with one another over time, the 
only way this interaction can be comprehended is by treating each element as 
separable at any particular point in time.  This separation is underwritten by Archer’s 
argument that ‘structure necessarily predates the actions which transform it’ (Archer, 
1995: 90).  And this emphasis on dualism is borne out by Archer’s statement that 
emergent structures: 
 
‘…are defined and identified independently of their occupants or encumbents 
and of the social interaction taking place between the latter.’ (Archer, 1995: 
176).   
 
Thus the dominant thrust of Archer’s approach is to argue that structure is, at any 
given time, not dependent for its character on the activities or understandings of 
synchronic agents.  Archer also subdivides structures into two categories, separating 
those which are social in character, which are based on ‘material relations’, and those 
which are cultural in character, which are based on relations between propositions 
(Archer, 1995: 175-179). Archer’s emphasis on the relative independence of structure 
from agents does not mean that she believes structure determines what happens in 
society at any moment in time, and nor does it mean that she believes that agents 
cannot transform structures.  Instead, Archer argues that although structures have their 
own conditioning influence on events, they do not determine what occurs, because 
agents are capable of exercising their reflexivity and responding in ways that reflect 
their distinctive personalities and commitments (Archer, 1995, 2003).  Likewise, these 
responses may lead to transformations in structures over time, agents’ activities 
leading in such cases to ‘structural elaboration’. 
 
Archer’s analysis of roles is consistent with analytical dualism, insofar as she divides 
the structural features of roles from agential response to them (Archer, 1995: 186-7).  
What we want to suggest is that this is an instance of a formal division in which 
phenomena that may be able to be systematically explained, diverse enactments of a 
role, are excluded from this prospect by fiat.  We will also be suggesting that this 
same division enshrines the questionable idea that the expectations for any role are 
singular in character.  We can begin to see this by considering the aspect of roles 
which Archer links to a robust social process: what she refers to as their ‘structural’ 
character.  Archer argues that a role structure is characterised by a set of obligations, 
including the tasks the incumbent has to do to satisfy the role specifications, and 
definitions of what is and is not a reasonable way to go about these tasks.  Archer’s 
next claim strongly echoes functionalism in arguing that there are ‘penalties and 
promotions’ which may be invoked, such that serious divergence from stated 
obligations will incur penalties, and successful compliance will lead to rewards.  As 
such, at any particular time, the set obligations of a role structure tend to shape actors’ 
behaviour insofar as they are motivated to gain ‘promotions’ and avoid ‘penalties’ 
 
As with functionalism, there is a strong implication in Archer’s analysis that any role 
has a singular set of definitions associated with it.  To take one example, Archer refers 
to ‘the role itself’ as a ‘prior definition of obligations, sanctions and interests’ 
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(Archer, 1995: 187).  Another quote from Archer also suggests that a role has a 
singular character: 
 
‘Only by examining the interplay between a role and its occupants is it 
possible to account for why some roles are personified in routine ways whilst 
others can be cumulatively transformed in the hands of their incumbents.’ 
(Archer, 1995: 187) 
 
In this quote, Archer differentiates between routine and non-routine personifications 
of roles and it is hard to see how there could be routine personifications of roles 
without these deriving from a single structural definition of that role.  Further, 
Archer’s wish to treat each structure as an ‘emergent property’ that has its own causal 
power (Archer, 1995: 172-7) appears to be incompatible with the idea that a role 
structure could be multiple in character.   
 
Although Archer’s general approach is to treat roles as having a single set of 
expectations, she also argues that role performances may have a degree of diversity.  
This diversity does not, for Archer, arise from the social constitution of the role itself, 
but from the performance of the role by an agent (Archer, 1995: 186-7).  Indeed, 
Archer places a strong emphasis on the ‘personification’ of roles and on the way in 
which agents can perform roles ‘in a singular manner’ (Archer, 2000b: 11; see also 
1995: 186-8).  These personifications are sometimes understood to ‘fill out’ aspects of 
the role that have not been specified (Archer, 1995: 187).  Likewise, for Archer, 
personifications are one way in which roles can come be transformed over time 
(Archer, 2000b: 304).   
 
Does Archer’s attribution of diverse role behaviour to agency assign this diversity to 
contingent factors that are not subject to systematic social explanation?  Archer gives 
agency a lengthy treatment in her work (see for example Archer, 2000b), and we do 
not have the space for an in-depth engagement with it here.  Nevertheless, when 
Archer discusses the personification of roles in some detail, the factors she identifies 
have importantly contingent features (Archer, 2000b: 288-295).  For Archer, the 
personal identity of the incumbent is a crucial contributor to the extent to which a role 
is personified, and the direction which this personification takes.  Although Archer 
allows that aspects of personal identity are shaped by society, she also contends that 
contingent factors in a child’s upbringing play a major role in shaping this identity 
(see Archer, 2000b: 288-291, 193-221).  Furthermore, ongoing decisions about how 
an incumbent should enact a role are part of a continuing dialectic between agent and 
society which is, for Archer, underdetermined by society.  This is because the 
outcome is importantly shaped by the ‘internal conversation’ of the individual which 
is understood to be relatively independent from society (Archer, 2000b: 293-5; see 
also Archer, 2003).  Thus it seems accurate to say that diversity in role behaviour, 
which Archer attributes to personification, is importantly contingent for her and not 
subject to systematic social explanation. 
 
Archer undoubtedly gives a more normatively positive view of diversity and 
contingency in role performance than Parsons does, given his use of the concept of 
deviance.  Nevertheless, the similarity that we have identified here is that in relation 
to any role, both see role expectations as singular and backed up by systematic social 
processes, and both see variation in role behaviour as contingent in character.  The 
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consequence of this is that the range of behaviour that is acknowledged to exist in 
relation to any particular role is defined as beyond the scope of systematic social 
explanation.  Systematic social explanation is rooted for these writers in the idea of 
shared expectations. 
 
It is relevant to see that Archer’s division of ‘structural’ role expectations from 
‘agential’ personifications starts to break down within her own analysis.  One of 
Archer’s examples of role personification points beyond individual variation to a 
socially-structured diversity of expectations without Archer having the theoretical 
mechanism to deal with this.  In this example, Archer discusses what she sees as the 
transformation of the expectations for the role of ‘University Professor’ (Archer, 
2000b: 296-7).  Initially, she suggests that individual personifications of this role have 
transformed role expectations about the character of interactions with students over 
time, these moving from the austere to the personable.  This could be interpreted 
consistently with Archer’s general approach as a process that involves a shift from 
one singular set of expectations to another singular set.  When discussing the 
changing role of academics over thirty years, however, Archer states that: 
 
…very different personifications of this role…have led to a much more 
approachable and pastorally involved occupant of the ‘same’ role – to the 
point where students, at least, now consider those remaining as distant 
Professors to be ‘no-good academics’. (Archer, 2000b: 297) 
 
Archer clearly suggests here that the expectations of students about the role of a 
Professor may be different to those of unspecified others.  We can imagine those on 
University promotions committees, for example, may not consider pastoral 
involvement to be a key part of the role.  But Archer has no theoretical mechanism for 
dealing with this diversity of expectations.  Indeed the very idea of ‘student 
expectations’ cuts across Archer’s theoretical divisions.  For Archer, role expectations 
are on the ‘structure’ side of her analytical dualism, and are not associated with what 
any group of actors understands to be the case, whereas students clearly are a 
particular group of actors.   
 
Of course, when a theorist’s example does not cohere with their general framework, it 
may be that it is the account of the example that is problematic, rather than the general 
theory.  With regards to Archer’s example we would certainly not wish to defend her 
view that the explanation of changing academic roles is straightforwardly the outcome 
of certain personifications being selected by students.  However, the implication that 
different groups can have different expectations of role incumbents, which can be 
derived from Archer’s example, is one that we want to uphold.  Importantly, the idea 
that expectations can be plural does pose difficulties for Archer’s general theory, 
which attempts to give role expectations a singular character at the ‘structural’ level.  
Archer wishes to separate the ‘structural’ expectations of a role from the ‘agential’ 
expectations of any particular social group.  But once we see that groups can have 
divergent expectations of role incumbents, what basis is there for claiming that there 
is also a ‘structural’ set of expectations?  Whose expectations are these, and how can 
they causally influence what agents do?  We shall return to these points later. 
 
Elder-Vass is a recent contributor to critical realist debates, and his approach to 
structure and roles is different enough to that of Archer to warrant independent 
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consideration.  To understand Elder-Vass’s analysis of roles we need to consider his 
analysis of norm circles, and this in turn needs to be contextualized by his analysis of 
emergence.  This is because, for Elder-Vass, roles have normative content which is 
backed up by the sanctioning power of a norm circle, itself understood to be an 
emergent phenomenon.   
 
Elder-Vass’s conception of emergence focuses on the ways in which a power can 
emerge because certain elements are related in a specific way which is necessary to 
generate that power.  In Elder-Vass’s terminology, there are parts that are related to 
one another in a particular way, which produces a whole that has its own causal 
powers/emergent properties (Elder-Vass, 2010: 16-7).  As Elder-Vass puts it: 
 
‘Emergence is the idea that a whole can have properties (or powers) that are 
not possessed by its parts – or, to put it more rigorously, properties that would 
not be possessed by its parts if they were not organised as a group into the 
form of this particular kind of whole.’ (Elder-Vass, 2007a: 28) 
 
For Elder-Vass, social structures should always be understood as the ‘causal powers 
of specific social groups’ and these powers are an emergent product of groups 
organized in a particular way (Elder-Vass, 2010: 86.  His emphasis).  For Elder-Vass, 
a norm is a rule that specifies appropriate ways of behaving, and he argues that 
regularised practices exist which are shaped by norms (Elder-Vass, 2010: 116-7).  
What he wants to do is to go beyond this observation to identify the ‘whole’ which 
has the emergent property/power to influence practices.  According to Elder-Vass, 
this whole is the ‘norm circle’, a group of people who share a normative belief and 
share a disposition to endorse and enforce that normative belief (Elder-Vass, 2010: 
122-7).  Because the group members have these properties and relate to each other by 
endorsing and enforcing, the group has the causal power to ‘tend to produce the 
corresponding practice’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 123).  Elder-Vass refers to this power as a 
‘normative social institution’, and he argues that in the absence of other influences, 
practices are regularised through this causal power of sanctioning.   
 
The contrast between the views of Archer and Elder-Vass starts to become clear when 
we see that for the latter it is people who are the ‘essential parts’ of a social structure 
(Elder-Vass, 2010: 86).  As such, Elder-Vass argues that the ‘causal powers of the 
whole remain dependent on the presence of the properties of the parts’ (Elder-Vass, 
2007a: 40).  Putting these points together, it becomes apparent that, for Elder-Vass, 
the power of social structure is synchronically dependent on agents with certain 
properties – in the case of norm circles, agents having normative beliefs and 
dispositions to act in certain ways.  And this means that, contrary to Archer’s 
dominant approach, Elder-Vass’s analysis suggests that structure is not synchronically 
independent of ‘social interaction’ and from what agents think and believe.5   
 
This brings us to Elder-Vass’s analysis of roles, which is also different to Archer’s in 
certain respects.  Unlike Archer, Elder-Vass does not see roles as structures in 
themselves, but as ‘normative constructions’ that are backed up by the emergent 
power of a norm circle (see Elder-Vass, 2010: 164, 122-7).  Roles are normative 
constructions which specify the relationships between members of an organization, 
allowing work to be divided up and coordinated (Elder-Vass, 2010: 145, 153).
6
  
According to Elder-Vass, role descriptions: 
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 ‘…implicitly or explicitly specify norms that define how an incumbent of the 
position concerned must relate to other members of the organisation and also 
how they must relate to outsiders when acting on behalf of the organisation’ 
(Elder-Vass, 2010: 153) 
 
The norms that characterise a role might be formalized but they may also be informal 
expectations that members of an organization have (Elder-Vass, 2010: 153).   
 
As mentioned above, Elder-Vass argues that roles as normative constructions come to 
influence people because of their backing by norm circles.  Roles as ‘normative 
constructions’ have an influence because members of the organization constitute a 
norm circle who respond positively to role conformity and negatively to deviation 
from the role.  The reinforcing power of a norm circle is, in Elder-Vass’s view, crucial 
because ‘it has a causal tendency to produce role-implementing behaviour by the 
members of the organisation’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 155).  This is important to an 
organization because, for Elder-Vass, the ability of an organization to act successfully 
is a product of a combination of appropriate role specification/differentiation by 
management and the ability of organizations to get incumbents to follow through 
these roles.  This leads to successfully coordinated interaction which can have 
spectacular results, as in Adam Smith’s example of the division of labour in the pin 
factory (Elder-Vass, 2010: 163, 165).   
 
From this discussion we can see that Elder-Vass analyses roles in a somewhat 
different way to Archer, insofar as he does not treat the character and influences of 
roles as independent from the understandings of present-day agents, but as dependent 
on those understandings.  Nevertheless, we would suggest that his approach has 
overlaps with those of Archer and indeed Parsons in important respects.  In relation to 
the issue of singularity, Elder-Vass seems to assume that each role has a single 
definition and set of expectations.  This assumption of the singular character of role 
definition is apparent in a range of places (Elder-Vass, 2010: 158-161), but it is 
perhaps most clearly expressed in an approving quotation of March and Simon: 
 
‘Not only is the role defined for the individual who occupies it, but it is known 
in considerable detail to others in the organization who have occasion to deal 
with him’ (March and Simon, 1993 [1958]: 22; cited in Elder-Vass, 2010: 
165). 
 
Although there is an acknowledgement here that a range of members of the 
organization deal with an individual occupying a role, there is a strong implication 
that there is nevertheless a single set of expectations for each role.
7
  Once again, let us 
emphasize that the issue is not whether Elder-Vass understands roles in a way which 
does not permit him to see that a more general role (say ‘manager’) can be divided 
into sub-roles (say ‘regional manager’, ‘human resources manager’ etc).  This is not 
the question.  Rather, the question is whether Elder-Vass conceptualizes roles, 
however ‘structurally’ differentiated, as having a single set of expectations which all 
relevant actors agree is the definition of the role.  
 
Having emphasized that shared-definition is the issue, it is worth considering whether, 
contrary to our argument so far, Elder-Vass’s treatment of norm circles and conflict 
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allows for competing role definitions from different actors.  After all, on the issue of 
conflict Elder-Vass allows that there may be conflicting norm circles operating on an 
individual, stating: 
 
‘My family, for example, may expect one thing of me and my class or 
workmates something quite different.’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 133) 
 
Thus Elder-Vass argues that normative intersectionality is possible, in which an 
individual is a member of more than one norm circle and may have conflicting 
pressures applied to them.  However, we would argue that this point cannot 
straightforwardly be applied to divergent expectations of how a role should be 
conducted for two reasons.  Firstly, the level of the analysis appears to be different.  
Elder-Vass is arguing that an individual can be subject to competing normative 
demands, as a member of more than one normative circle.  By contrast, the question 
about roles is the extent to which the role itself is subject to competing definitions.   
 
This relates to the second point which is that Elder-Vass’s analysis of competing 
demands on the individual still implies the singularity of the norms promoted in each 
demand.  Elder-Vass argues that individuals who are subject to competing normative 
demands are in that situation because of their membership of a range of norm circles.  
On Elder-Vass’s account of the above example, an individual may be subject to one 
set of expectations as a family member and another as a workmate, and these may 
clash.  But this implies that each set of expectations is self-consistent such that there is 
not disagreement about what it is to be a good family member or a good work-mate.  
And this assumption about normative agreement within a norm circle is borne out by 
Elder-Vass’s remark that: 
 
 ‘…institutions depend on the members of the norm circle sharing a similar 
understanding of the norm concerned…’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 123) 
 
As roles are sets of norms for Elder-Vass, we can see that his analysis suggests that 
members will have a similar understanding of the roles.  Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that Elder-Vass’s account is based on an assumption of the 
singularity of role definitions.
8
 
 
The other key issue is how diversity of behaviour within any role is therefore 
explained.  As with Parsons and Archer, because role definitions are treated as 
singular, the sanctioning processes that Elder-Vass sees as influencing role behaviour 
are identified as promoting one type of performance.  As such, variation in role 
behaviour is attributed not to systematically explicable features of a role but to 
contingencies.  Those contingencies that attributed to individuals
9
 are analysed under 
the rubric of agency rather than that of deviance.  As we saw, Archer attributes the 
diversity of role behaviours to role-personification.  Likewise, Elder-Vass is keen to 
stress that those who uphold a role are not fully determined in their action by the role 
specification, as their own powers as individuals can be called on to co-produce the 
outcomes of their action (Elder-Vass, 2010: 159).  Elder-Vass states: 
 
‘Individuals choose to occupy the role, and can choose to leave it, and they 
also make decisions about how to perform it…’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 159) 
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One point at which Elder-Vass emphasizes the need for individual decision-making is 
when such an individual is put under pressure from different normative circles, e.g. 
where family expect one thing of an individual and workmates expect another (Elder-
Vass, 2010: 133).  At such a point social influences are insufficient to produce an 
outcome, leaving the role behaviour to the individual decision-making of an agent. 
 
 
3.  The Alternative: Diverse Role Behaviour as Systematically Explicable 
In this section we want to consider whether there is way to account for diverse 
behaviours in a role that offers a possibility of systematic explanation excluded by the 
approaches considered above.  As such, we will turn to the work of Gross, Mason and 
McEachern (1958) whose critical analysis of the concept of roles seems to have been 
under-explored.  This may well be because ethnomethodological critiques of 
structural-functionalism seized the imagination of sociologists to a greater extent, 
perhaps due to their apparently more radical orientation.  Despite the interest at the 
time, however, later ‘mainstream’ sociology seems to have largely set 
ethnomethodological ideas aside.  In fact, pre- and post-ethnomethodological 
approaches like structural functionalism and critical realism have more overlap with 
each other than they do with ethnomethodology.  In relation to our own argument, a 
standard interpretation of ethnomethodological ideas (see for example Heritage, 1984) 
is pushing in the opposite direction to our analysis as they place a great emphasis on 
contingency of behaviour and question the very notion of robust social processes that 
spread beyond any particular context.  In this respect the analyses of Gross et al in 
Explorations in Role Analysis (1958) are preferable from our perspective because they 
offer an alternative analysis of roles to structural-functionalism (and critical realism) 
which opens up the potential for systematic explanation of diverse role behaviour.  
 
The initial critical work of Gross et al is directed at the assumption found in a range 
of anthropological, sociological and social psychological theories that the roles in any 
particular society, such as ‘mother’ or ‘teacher’, each have a standard, single set of 
definitions associated with them (Gross et al, 1958: 4).  As Gross et al point out, this 
assumption of definitional agreement on role expectations may be explicitly defended 
or simply be implicit within a theory.  Having identified that many theories of roles 
assume definitional agreement, Gross et al  go on to make a case for an alternative 
view.  They argue that complete agreement on current role definition amongst all 
relevant definers is best understood as a limiting case. In the view of Gross et al, 
although there must be some degree of commensurability of expectations, the extent 
of variation is significant for sociology to understand (Gross et al, 1958: 43, 74).  To 
empirically illustrate the importance of variation Gross et al engaged in an extensive 
study of the role
10
 of ‘superintendent’ in schools in the USA, and particularly in the 
state of Massachusetts .  The superintendent was
11
 a role in a formal organization – a 
school system.  The role had a formally specified relationship to various other roles – 
school board member, teacher – and relations with other constituencies like 
professional educators and the community around the school.  There was a 
professional literature on the appropriate role behaviour for a superintendent such that 
role definition could not be considered to be under-developed (Gross et al, 1958: 79-
80).  To understand what the superintendent did we need to consider the relation of 
the role to that of school board member.  In Massachusetts the school board was 
elected from the local community who also made a large contribution to the finances 
for running the local school system (Gross et al, 1958: 100).  The superintendent was 
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employed by the board to be its ‘executive officer’, and the board was thus 
‘superordinate’ to the superintendent.  As to what the superintendent was supposed to 
do, Gross et al state that: 
 
‘…the tasks of the superintendent are to administer and supervise the physical 
and human resources involved in the internal functioning of the school 
system…’ (Gross et al, 1958: 123) 
 
These tasks included hiring personnel, being responsible for promotions, 
recommending levels for teacher salaries, overseeing budgets, and making 
recommendations about what is appropriate and inappropriate expenditure (Gross et 
al, 1958: 258-60). 
 
Although there was apparently general agreement about the broad parameters of what 
a superintendent was supposed to do, these general characterisations were hardly 
sufficient to specify the role.  And what Gross et al argue is that once we get into the 
realm of more detailed specification, there were, in some cases, conflicting 
expectations about what the role incumbent was supposed to do.  They derived this 
conclusion on the basis of interviews with a large number of superintendents and 
school board members which attempted to elicit their definitions of various aspects of 
the superintendent role (Gross et al, 1958: 79-94).  
 
A wide range of aspects of the superintendent role were analysed, but let us try to pick 
out some salient examples here.  One issue investigated was the extent to which a 
variety of tasks were understood to be the dominant responsibility of the 
superintendent or the school board (Gross et al, 1958: 123-5).  These tasks included 
hiring a new teacher, deciding when a new textbook was needed and making 
recommendations for increases to salaries.  Gross et al found that superintendents 
tended to assign more responsibility to themselves for undertaking these tasks than 
school board members did.  Putting this another way, there was a tendency for 
superintendents and school board members to disagree in their expectations about the 
superintendent role.  The disagreement was over the extent to which superintendents 
had the dominant responsibility for hiring teachers, deciding when new textbooks 
were needed, and so on.   
 
Another example was of expectations of the superintendent’s role with respect to 
salary recommendations (Gross et al, 1958: 267-272).  Here the data was based on 
superintendents’ own views of the expectations of others and such data is likely to be 
less reliable than that provided by the others themselves.  Nevertheless, there is no 
particular reason to doubt, for example, the claim that teachers expect the 
superintendent to fight for as large a salary as possible for them, and that parents and 
labour unions tend to share this expectation.  It also seems reasonable to accept 
superintendents’ reports that tax-payers associations tend to have the expectation that 
superintendents will fight to keep salary costs down, as do town finance committees.  
As such, we can say that there were clashing expectations of the role of 
superintendent in relation to salary recommendations.  As with the division of labour 
between superintendents and school boards, this was not a matter of differing 
expectations about some small, unimportant part of the role, but about the 
responsibilities of the superintendent in relation to key tasks.  This is not to say that 
differing role definitions are necessarily completely incompatible with one another. 
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After all, divergent role definitions may well overlap to some extent, such that 
differences may emerge only in some areas and not others.  Furthermore, there may 
be agreement in some expectations even though different role-definers may promote 
those expectations for different reasons.
12
 
 
Let us sum up what we take to be important about these arguments for assessing the 
return to role in recent social theory.  Theoretically speaking, Gross et al point out 
that if we treat roles as characterised by expectations or definitions, then it is possible 
that there can be different expectations and definitions in relation to a role at a 
particular time, and this possibility should not be foreclosed by a theoretical 
assumption of definitional agreement.  By contrast, Archer, Elder-Vass and Parsons 
do seem to foreclose on the possibility of variation by assuming that roles are defined 
in unitary ways.  Empirically speaking, Gross et al give an illustration of variation in 
role definition by showing that in relation to one important position within a formal 
organization, the superintendent in the school system, there are variant definitions.  
And, of course, the school system also contains within it a number of other roles and 
what is true for superintendents is likely to be true for the other roles as well.  By 
contrast, it seems distinctly possible that research conducted within the framework of 
Archer, Elder-Vass or Parsons would not have been sensitive to variations in role 
definitions of this kind.
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What we want to do now is consider further the potential impact of the assumption of 
definitional agreement on empirical research.  One issue is what researchers who are 
primed to look for definitional agreement will do to secure a single role account.  A 
possibility discussed by Gross et al is that researchers will try to smooth out 
differences in expectations and construct a role account out of something like the 
average expectations for a position (Gross et al, 1958: 21-5).  The problem with such 
a move is that if there are systematically different expectations in different groups 
these will be obscured in the smoothing out process.  For example, using this 
averaging procedure would smooth out the different expectations of school board 
members and superintendents, the ‘average’ expectations representing neither 
position. 
 
Another possibility when attempting to construct a single role account is to accept the 
definition of the role that is supplied by senior management.  Out of the thinkers that 
we have considered Elder-Vass, in particular, sometimes seems to be treating role 
definition in this way (Elder-Vass, 2010: 163-4).  Although senior managers often 
have resources to back up their role definition, it would, in our view, be a mistake to 
accept their definition as definitive.  After all, it is very likely that any role incumbent 
does not have to merely deal with senior management but with a range of other 
incumbents of different positions, each of whom has some expectations regarding the 
role in question.  For example, whereas senior managers may have the expectation 
that construction workers should wear harnesses when working at height, co-workers 
who are relying on construction tasks being done quickly and effectively to secure 
bonuses may believe that harnesses are an unnecessary obstruction and expect them to 
not be worn where they impede the speed of the task.  If social scientists focused only 
on the role definitions of senior managers, they would fail to grasp definitions that 
were relevant to understanding the expectations conveyed to role incumbents by all 
parties. 
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Following on from the arguments of Gross et al we would argue that the presumption 
of unity in role definition mistakenly closes off various possibilities for systematic 
social explanation.  For one example of this, let us return to the first case of divergent 
role definitions identified by Gross et al that was discussed above.  Recall that this 
was a disagreement between superintendents and school board members over who 
had the dominant responsibility for tasks such as hiring teachers, recommending new 
textbooks, and recommending salary increases.  It is only if social scientists identify 
this disagreement, rather than smoothing it out, that they will see that there is an 
interesting explanatory task here – the task of trying to explain why these expectations 
differ.  Gross et al put forward their own hypothesis in this case, arguing that because 
both school board members and superintendents can be held responsible for these key 
tasks, incumbents of each position are pushed towards attempting to assume as much 
control as possible over the decisions, which leads to the divergent attributions of 
responsibility (Gross et al, 1958: 122-3).  Whether or not we accept this particular 
explanation, the important point is that the task of explaining divergence is opened up 
by allowing that roles may not be characterised by definitional agreement. 
 
Given the focus of this article, another important explanatory task is that of 
accounting for variation in role performance sociologically.  As we have seen Elder-
Vass, Archer and Parsons agree that there is variation in role performance, such that 
there are different enactments of ‘the same’ role.  For Parsons this is because 
individuals may not be properly socialized into role-expectations; for Elder-Vass and 
Archer it is because variety in role performance can be positively attributed to agency, 
to the characteristics and powers of the individual.  Explanations of role variation with 
reference to the individuality of role-incumbents have been long-standing enough that 
Gross et al were able to comment on it in their volume.  They state: 
 
‘One model, which is often followed, posits, either implicitly or explicitly, 
consensus on expectations and tries to account for the differential behavior of 
position incumbents by the variability in their attitudes, values, personality 
characteristics, or some other phenomenon which can be said to intervene 
between the positional expectation and the role behavior’ (Gross et al, 1958: 
4) 
 
In the view of Gross et al, many role theorists assume that roles are characterised by 
definitional agreement and, if this were the case, a plausible account of variation in 
role performance would be the individuality of the incumbent.  However, if a role is 
in fact subject to multiple definitions, then variation in role performance may actually 
be importantly due to variation in role definition.  Gross et al thus state: 
 
‘If individuals hold variant orientations this should be expressed in variant 
definitions of a role as well as in different behavior.’ (Gross et al, 1958: 30) 
 
In other words, where there appear to be ‘individual’ variations in performance, social 
scientists are encouraged to look for variations in expectations that account for these.  
For example, if it is found that some construction workers who operate at height wear 
a harness, and others do not, a possible angle to explore is whether there are indeed 
conflicting expectations about this, say from senior management focusing on safety 
and from co-workers with requirements for jobs to be done speedily.
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  If variant 
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expectations are discovered, this permits a systematic social explanation of variant 
behaviours rather than by recourse to the contingencies of individual dispositions. 
 
This suggests that there are interesting explanatory tasks in accounting for role 
behaviour in cases where holders of a position are placed under pressure by the 
differing and potentially contradictory expectations from incumbents of other 
positions, with differentially distributed resources to make their definitions count.  
Enthusiasts for ideas of agency see this as a point at which agential choices make an 
important contribution to these outcomes.  Such choices might be understood to have 
occurred in childhood with the result that the agent ‘chose’, after deliberation, certain 
values which guided later actions, including deciding which of the conflicting sets of 
explanations to follow (for a version of this kind of argument see Archer, 2000b; 
2003).  Or the choice might be understood to be something that took place in the 
conflict situation itself, with agents being seen as able to take conscious choices about 
which course of action to follow particularly when there are competing pressures on 
the agent (for a version of this argument see Elder-Vass, 2010: 133).    
 
The question of the place of agency and/or individuality in social life is a complex 
one and there is little space to address it here (for some thoughts on the matter see 
Holmwood and Stewart, 1991; Holmwood, 1996).  However, we would argue that it 
is crucial for sociologists to recognize that immediately attributing variations in 
actors’ behaviours to ‘choice’ can short-circuit the possibilities for systematic 
explanation.  That is to say, sociologists should seriously explore possible 
explanations which focus on intelligible social processes and influences before 
resorting to attributions of choice.  If these social explanations come to be justified, 
then the rationale for invoking agency is diminished.  Recall that we are here 
considering cases where incumbents are exposed to contradictory pressures about 
what they should do in their position.  If the result is that each incumbent tends to 
vary in their behaviour, sometimes following one set of expectations and sometimes 
following another, it may be possible to explain why this is.  In the case of 
construction workers, it may be that they systematically tend to wear safety harnesses 
when they know visits from senior management or inspections are likely, and they 
tend not to wear safety harnesses when this is not the case.   
 
Another sort of challenge would be to explain cases where each individual incumbent 
of a position tends to behave in a stable manner, but there are differences between the 
ways in which incumbents behave, some consistent with one set of expectations and 
some consistent with another.  If, for example, some workers regularly tend to engage 
in cautious, safety-first behaviour in the workplace, and others do not, it may be 
possible to explain why this is.  One study of the safety consciousness of workers in 
agricultural work suggests that this is promoted by workers participating in ‘safety 
activities’ which contribute to what the authors see as ‘cognitive change’ but what we 
might also characterise as the reinforcement of management safety expectations 
(Westaby and Lee, 2003).  If this is the case, whether or not role incumbents have 
participated in safety activities may contribute to an explanation of why they do or do 
not engage in safety-first behaviour in the workplace.   
 
It is, of course, hardly possible to prove that a systematic social explanation will 
always be found to account for who takes up which variant role definition.  But it 
seems to us a more promising commitment to pursue than assigning variation to 
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agency and abandoning the hope of systematic social explanation at that point.  To 
say this is not to deny that some degree of personification of roles is a possibility.  
Even on this subject, though, there may be room for a less individual-centred 
perspective than the approaches put forward by some proponents of the structure- 
agency division.  One possibility, inspired by a thought of Merton’s, is that the way in 
which a role is personified is at least partly a result of the other roles that the 
incumbent holds (Merton, 1957).  For example, a lecturer who is also a parent might 
have more sympathy than other lecturers for students whose caring responsibilities 
interfere with their ability to submit work on time.  As such, an acknowledgement of 
personification might still be incorporated within an approach which emphasizes 
social processes rather than contingent agential decisions.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
As we emphasised in the Introduction, there are two intertwined lines of argument 
within this article: a more specific one about the nature of roles and role behaviour, 
and a more general argument about the social scientific analysis of contingency in 
social life.  In relation to roles, we have argued that it is a mistake to assume that the 
expectations for any role are singular in character.  In our view, there are plausible 
sociological reasons to think that role expectations may vary across different groups.  
Likewise, we have argued that it is a mistake to assume that variation in role 
performance is due to contingent factors like deviance or individual agency.  Rather, 
locating divergent expectations may help to explain cases such as those where 
incumbents act differently in different situations. 
 
In relation to our wider argument, we noted early on that approaches such as 
functionalism and critical realism put forward ‘compromise’ positions insofar as they 
attempt to avoid an over-commitment to the contingency of social life whilst not 
removing it altogether.  Our issue with the form that this compromise takes is that the 
theoretical structure it relies on sets an a priori limit upon systematic explanation.  
Starting out from a belief that contingency must be what accounts for certain kinds of 
diversity deflects investigators from considering possible systematic explanations of 
the variety of behaviour.  Although it is not feasible to insist that contingency has no 
place in social life, what we are questioning is the attempt to prejudge the extent and 
location of this contingency.  It is important to challenge such pre-judgements, as 
claims about contingency are always potentially defeasible on the basis of robust 
influences that are located by ongoing systematic social scientific investigation (see 
Holmwood, 1996; Kemp, 2009).  In other words, investigation can show that a 
phenomenon that was previously understood to be contingent is actually part of a 
robust social process that can be systematically explained.  To emphasize again, we 
believe that there is an overlap between aspects of critical realism and our own 
approach in terms of an interest in empirically identifying social processes.  What we 
are arguing is for ways of thinking about the social world which do not 
unintentionally exclude certain phenomena from systematic explanation a priori on 
the presumption that they are contingent in character.   
 
Finally, our approach does not entirely rule out the role of contingency in social life.  
But it does contend that the boundary between that which can be systematically 
explained, and that which is attributed to contingency, cannot be fixed by theoretical 
fiat but is the subject of ongoing exploration through substantive investigation. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 In this piece references to the robustness of a social process denote that the process, 
if it existed, would contribute to shaping outcomes in a certain way.  By identifying a 
process as robust we are not making a judgement about its frequency. 
2
 It is perhaps useful to clarify that by ‘contingent’ we do not mean ‘possible but not 
necessary’ (cf Sayer, 2000).  A better approximation for our usage would be ‘not 
predetermined by causal relations’. 
3
 The definition may be ‘singular’ despite there being a ‘set’ of expectations if this set 
of expectations is understood to be the same for all relevant actors. 
4
 Parsons does also refer to two more factors that could generate diversity but tends to 
read these as particularly important insofar as they may contribute to reinforcing 
deviance.  These are the potential for highly-abstract norms to be difficult to apply to 
concrete situations and the potential for role-conflict in which different roles the 
incumbent occupies may produce competing expectations on incumbents (Parsons, 
1952: 268-272).  In relation to role conflict, the paradox is that because Parsons’ 
analytical backdrop is the notion of a perfectly-coordinated system, role conflict must, 
for him, be contingent.  It may appear that Parsons’ analysis of role-conflict is 
‘structural’ insofar as it appears to be identifying two (or more) role structures as 
clashing with one another.  However, within his own theoretical system ‘structures’ 
are always related to processes that promote ‘functioning’ and, in Parsons’ terms, role 
conflict cannot be functional.   Therefore it has to be attributed to the realm of 
contingency.  Alexander takes up a similar position to Parsons when he states that 
‘functionalism is concerned with integration as a possibility and with deviance and 
processes of social control as facts.’ (1985: 9) 
5
 It is worth noting that some remarks made by Elder-Vass might be taken to be 
promoting a clearer separation of structure and agency.  One instance of this is Elder-
Vass’s discussion of the ‘actual norm circle’, that is, the group of people who share, 
endorse and enforce a norm.  Elder-Vass states: ‘The extent of the actual norm circle, 
it should be clear, is independent of the beliefs about it held by any given individual.  
The two are ontologically distinct.  One important corollary of this ontological 
separation is that the individual can be wrong about the normative environment that 
they face.’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 129).  It is important to be clear that although Elder-
Vass’s analysis may be consistent in arguing that the extent of a normative circle is 
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independent of an individual’s beliefs about it, it would be inconsistent for him to 
argue that it is independent of individuals’ beliefs.  If Elder-Vass’s general approach 
is correct, it is only because some people have normative beliefs and a commitment to 
sanctioning others that norm circles as social structures exist at all.  
6
 Elder-Vass distinguishes between the roles and the people who hold them in a way 
that has close parallels with Lockwood’s system/social distinction, also employed by 
Archer.  Lockwood states ‘Whereas the problem of social integration focuses 
attention upon the orderly or conflictual relationships between the actors, the problem 
of social integration focuses on the orderly or conflictual relationships between the 
parts of a social system.’ (Lockwood, 1992: 400) 
7
 Elder-Vass does argue that norms drawn from culture outside of an organizations 
control may impact ‘performance in the role’, as in when cultural values of honesty 
and punctuality are norms supported by norm circles that stretch outside the 
organization (Elder-Vass, 2010: 166).  But the statement that such norms may impact 
on performance suggests that these cultural elements are not seen as offering a 
conflicting definition of the role. 
8
 Let us just emphasize a point made earlier: when noting that theorists treat the 
definition of any particular role as having a singular set of expectations, we are not 
saying that these theorists assume that all actors have a personal normative 
commitment to these expectations.  Elder-Vass explicitly denies holding such a view 
(Elder-Vass, 2010: 125-6) and it seems doubtful whether Parsons or Archer accept it 
either.  But they do all accept that there is nevertheless a single set of (system or 
structural) expectations for each role. 
9
 As we saw above, Elder-Vass does allow that roles may clash and this may generate 
diverse behaviours.  Archer (1995) and Parsons (1952) make similar claims.  Insofar 
as agency or unmotivated choice is understood to account for the resolution of such 
clashes, however, the account of the behaviour in such cases retains a strongly 
contingent element. 
10
 Gross et al use the term ‘position’ to distinguish a post from its associated 
expectations (Gross et al, 1958: 48).  Although we can see some point in this 
terminological stipulation it is easier when debating with other approaches to retain 
the term ‘role’ and refer to divergent expectations for that role. 
11
 This description is in the past tense given that Gross et al are describing the 
schooling system in Massachusetts over 50 years ago. 
12
 For example, labour unions may expect superintendents to promote high salaries for 
teachers in order to generally drive workers’ wages up, whereas teachers may expect 
this of superintendents for reasons more directly tied to their self-interest. 
13
 Archer did write at length about education systems in her Social Origins of 
Educational Systems (1979).  However we do not discuss this work here because: (i) 
it does not analyse American systems of education which our example is drawn from; 
(ii) roles are not indicated to be a major theme of the work, with neither the term 
‘role’ nor major theorists of roles such as Parsons appearing in the index.   
14
 We are not assuming the benevolence of management; insofar as there is a safety-
oriented aspect to management policy this is likely to be related to the existence of 
wider safety regulations, inspections and penalties.  In the absence of these, or 
perhaps alongside these, there is likely to be some imperative to get tasks done 
quickly in a way which may compromise employee safety.  
